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Within the emerging field of cultural neuroscience (CN) one branch of research focuses
on the neural underpinnings of “individualistic/Western” vs. “collectivistic/Eastern”
self-views. These studies uncritically adopt essentialist assumptions from classic
cross-cultural research, mainly following the tradition of Markus and Kitayama (1991),
into the domain of functional neuroimaging. In this perspective article we analyze
recent publications and conference proceedings of the 18th Annual Meeting of the
Organization for Human Brain Mapping (2012) and problematize the essentialist and
simplistic understanding of “culture” in these studies. Further, we argue against the
binary structure of the drawn “cultural” comparisons and their underlying Eurocentrism.
Finally we scrutinize whether valuations within the constructed binarities bear the risk of
constructing and reproducing a postcolonial, orientalist argumentation pattern.
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At the 18th Annual Meeting of the Organization for Human
Brain Mapping which was held in Beijing (June 10–14, 2012)
the official program was amended by the philosophical supple-
ment “Entering the Mind’s I: Some reflections on the Chinese
notion of self.” The supplement begins by explaining that the
“concept of the individual as outlined by Western philosophy
finds its most successful and most immediate conceptual and
visual transposition in the work The Vitruvian Man by Leonardo
[da Vinci].” The authors of this supplement pursue by stating
that “No iconographic representation could be more antithetical
to the concept of an individual characterized by the entirety of
Chinese philosophy and culture (. . . )” (Lietti, 2012).
During the conference various other contributions, symposia
[e.g., “Imaging the sociocultural human brain” by Gao (2012)],
i-poster presentations, or posters addressed “culturally” tuned
ways of understanding the self. In these presentations the neu-
ral basis of “individualistic/Western” and “collectivistic/Eastern”
“cultures” and their way of treating the self were discussed in com-
parison based on new insights from functional neuroimaging.
But what does it mean to presume a “culturally” imprinted
self? And what are the implications of considering two seemingly
complementary groups with putatively opposed world- and self-
views? The classic review of “cross-cultural” research by Markus
and Kitayama (1991) represents the primary inspiration for actual
neuroimaging work on “East/West” comparisons. We argue that,
by doing so, assumptions implied in classic cross-cultural research
are adopted to the functional neuroimaging community with-
out being scrutinized. “Psychological” findings about “cultural
differences” are thereby translated onto a “biological” level treat-
ing “culture” as a characteristic which can be read out from the
body. By means of neuroimaging technology the simplifications
of “culture” inherent to many cross-cultural psychological studies
receive additional support as cultural differences can now be
fostered by biological “evidence.”
Here we elaborate why such neuroscientific findings bear the
risk of constructing and reproducing essentialist (1), binarized
(2), and Eurocentric (3) ways of thinking and acting which follow
a postcolonial and orientalist tradition (4). These four dimen-
sions build the frame for the current analysis. They all refer to
specific traditions of critique which originate from philosophy
and social science and which will be introduced in more detail
in the respective sections of this manuscript.
The endeavor to studying “cultural” phenomena by using
functional MRI started only in the last decade (Chiao, 2009;
Han and Northoff, 2009; Vogeley and Roepstorff, 2009;
Kitayama and Park, 2010; Losin et al., 2010; Bao and Pöppel,
2012; Han et al., 2013; Rule et al., 2013). Since the year 2000
the number of publications in the cultural neurosciences
(CN) has increased tremendously. Although particular con-
cepts of “culture” are implied, these are only rarely explicitly
addressed (Martínez Mateo et al., 2012, 2013). Within the
field of CN, however, a particular branch has focused on “cul-
turally” tuned ways of understanding the self [see Martínez
Mateo et al. (2012) for a review on different branches in
CN]. For the purpose of the present article we searched (i)
peer-reviewed English language manuscripts of original func-
tional MRI studies indexed in large databases (e.g., Google
Scholar; PubMed) and (ii) abstracts published in the this year’s
OHBM abstract book [http://www.humanbrainmapping.org/
files/2012MeetingFiles/OHBM_2012-Abstractsfinal.pdf] which
addressed the neural correlates of the self or self-concepts such
as individualism and collectivism in a “cultural” context using
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cerebral blood flow imaging techniques such as fMRI or fNIRS.
Overall, 10 manuscripts and 10 conference abstracts fulfilled
these criteria and thus, formed the data pool for the present
analysis.
From these publications we extracted the aforementioned
four fundamental dimensions which we problematize by briefly
discussing their immanent assumptions, their implications and
consequences.
ESSENTIALISM
Essentialism refers to the idea that the concept of e.g., the
“Chinese” or the “Westerner” has its own real and discrete essence
(Narayan, 1998). This view does not consider the historical and
socio-political contexts in which such concepts are used. Many
of the analyzed studies take such an essentialist understanding
of “culture” as their starting point for the elaboration of their
research hypotheses as well as for the justification of observed
neural differences between “cultural” groups. Wang and col-
leagues e.g., speak of “collectivistic brains” (Wang et al., 2012)
when referring to their Chinese sample, while Sul and colleagues
label their Chinese participants “collectivistic people” having an
“interdependent self, typically found in collectivistic cultures
(e.g., East Asia)” (Sul et al., 2012). Other variations on this theme,
which likewise view an individual as a representative for a “cul-
tural” totality, assign their study participants a “Chinese self”
(Zhang et al., 2006) or a group membership in “Eastern “Face”
cultures such as Chinese” (Honghong et al., 2012). In these exam-
ples, “cultural identity” is made essential. Said criticizes such
essentialism as it implies violence toward the presumed “mem-
bers” of such categories as they are forced to correspond to this
conceptual essence: “An Oriental man was first an Oriental and
only second a man” (Said, 1979). Balibar (2011) and Taguieff
(1991) claim that even without touching the concept of “race,”
an essentialist idea of one “cultural identity” follows a culturalis-
tic, “neo-racist” argumentation pattern. The term “neo-racism”
points out that approaches to “cultural diversity,” even though
having overcome a system of “racial” hierarchies, share the idea
of clearly definable “cultural” demarcations. Thus, as soon as per-
sons are reduced to their “cultural belongings,” and this forms
the basis for interpreting their behavior, there is no significant
difference between the concept of “race” and the concept of
“culture.”
BINARITY
“Cross-cultural” research necessarily involves comparisons
between “cultural” groups. Interestingly, within the analyzed CN
studies all comparisons follow a solely binary structure assuming
“cultural” values as being opposed to each other. The starting
point of all analyzed studies is the distinction between “Europe”
and “Asia,” “Occident” and “Orient” or “East” and “West.” Based
on this dichotomous world-view, “cultural” values are linked
to either one of these binary poles. For example, “indepen-
dent cultures (such as the German)” (De Greck et al., 2012)
are paralleled to “East Asian cultures [which] generally show
more inter-dependent self-views” (Korn et al., 2012), “Western
societies [which] are individualistic, promoting the value of
independence, individual goals and rights” are opposed to
“Eastern societies [which] are collectivistic, promoting the value
of interdependence, group goals and duties.” (Vizioli et al., 2012)
or finally, group-agency is distinguished from self-agency as in
the following quotation from Kobayashi et al. (2007): “Increasing
evidence from socio-psychological studies suggests that Japanese
and other Asian cultures encourage the use of group-agencymore
than individualistic self-agency [. . . ]. The diminished activity
in the TPJ area in Japanese adults and children during the ToM
tasks might represent the demoted sense of self-other distinction
in the Japanese culture.”
Some of the analyzed studies circumvent the direct compari-
son of “biologically” or “geographically” predefined groups and
use “cultural priming” methods instead. Here, “symbols (e.g.,
the American flag vs. a Chinese dragon), legendary figures from
folklore or popular cartoons (e.g., Superman vs. Stone Monkey),
famous people (e.g., MarilynMonroe vs. a Chinese opera singer),
and landmarks (e.g., the Capitol Building vs. the Great Wall)”
(Hong et al., 2000) are used in order to prime “cultural frame-
works” (Sui et al., 2013) in “bicultural” individuals. By this,
the authors aim to activate a “corresponding cultural meaning
system” (Hong et al., 2000) and trigger “prototypically inter-
dependent” or “independent” behaviors, respectively (Markus
and Kitayama, 2010). However, such “cultural priming” obvi-
ously depends on simplistic presumptions about “biculturality,”
viewing both “cultures” as similarly dozing in one’s identity wait-
ing to be woken up. The essence of this awakening is found in
stereotypical attributions about the respective “cultural” contexts
(e.g., China being represented by the Great Wall or “the West”
being represented by the Statue of Liberty). Moreover, the binary
structure is still at the core of such priming studies. Therefore,
all results have to confirm the underlying binary self-construal
(e.g., “independent” or “interdependent”). Furthermore, “cul-
tural” representation is valued regarding its fit to the expected,
“mandated way” [“Within a given culture, however, individuals
will vary in the extent to which they are good cultural represen-
tatives and construe the self in the mandated way” (Markus and
Kitayama, 1991)]. The results, ultimately, cannot but reproduce
the binary structure and thereby strengthen the simplistic under-
standing of “cultural frameworks.” All internal heterogeneities
within a construed population are thereby resolved in favor of this
one central distinction. Further, we view this to be problematic as
binary structures always imply hierarchies between the two poles1.
EUROCENTRISM
Neatly tied to the latter reasoning, i.e., that binarity implies and
reproduces structures of dominance, is that a Eurocentric per-
spective is promoted in the analyzed studies. As the historian
Dipesh Chakrabarty argues in his book Provincializing Europe, up
until the present, Eurocentric structures remain mostly unchal-
lenged. Hence, the figure of Europe remains a cultural bench-
mark for difference and deviance and functions as a “silent
1The idea that binarities always have an inherent hierarchical structure follows
a critique articulated by Jacques Derrida among others: “We are not dealing
with the peaceful coexistence of a vis-à-vis, but rather with a violent hierarchy.
One of the two terms governs the other (axiologically, logically, etc.), or has
the upper hand” (Derrida, 1981).
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referent” (Chakrabarty, 2000). Thereby the “Western perspec-
tive” is taken as the “gold standard” (Oyserman et al., 2002).
Accordingly, in many incidents authors contrast “non-Western”
values or identities with their “Western” counterparts: e.g., “The
essential aspect of this view involves a conception of the self
as an autonomous, independent person; we thus refer to it
as the independent construal of the self. Other similar labels
include individualist, egocentric, separate, autonomous, idiocen-
tric, and self-contained. We assume that, on average, relatively
more individuals in Western cultures will hold this view than
will individuals in non-Western cultures.” (Markus and Kitayama,
1991) or “Many non-Western cultures do not construe behav-
iors as personal and intentional” (Kobayashi and Temple, 2009).
“Western” views on the self are further linked to modernity and
freedom [e.g., “In more individualistic cultures, the expression of
thoughts, preferences, and needs is viewed as an expression of
selfhood, and thus, freedom of expression is a sign of individ-
ual freedom and an independent self.” (Sherman et al., 2009)],
which underscores an implicit valuation of this part of the binary
structure.
POSTCOLONIAL AND ORIENTALIST VIEW ON THE SELF
We argue that the above mentioned valuations within
the constructed binarities fit in a postcolonial, orientalist
argumentation-pattern. The term “post-colonial” usually refers
to a historical period of formal independence after colonialism.
However, within the humanities and social sciences, the term
postcolonial (spelled without a hyphen) refers both to a historical
process with innumerable repercussions continuing to the
present day and to its critical analysis. Against this background,
postcolonial studies critically engage with and challenge the
seemingly fixed and clearly persistent, yet changing, colonial
binarities such as modern/pre-modern or civilized/uncivilized
and their contemporary reproductions [see e.g., Said, 1979].
From a postcolonial perspective, the centuries of European
expansion are understood as a unique, global process, which
has been socially, culturally, and materially inscribed into the
present structure of the world. The politics of binarity, deeply
ingrained in colonialism, allowed a privileged order, whereby
Europe represented itself as the enlightened and modern self.
Modernity and Enlightenment imagined as products of European
autogenesis, hence legitimated the European civilizing mission.
Orientalism, as defined by Said (1979), refers to the production
of knowledge about the “East” or the “Orient” as complementary
to the “West” or the “Occident”. Research in this context, i.e., ori-
entalism, is based on stereotypes and contains racist implications,
dating back to the British colonial politics from the beginning of
the last century (Said, 1979). The following quotation as stated in
a direct context of colonial regime would provide such an example
for orientalist reasoning: “The European is a close reasoner; his
statements of fact are devoid of any ambiguity; he is a natural logi-
cian, albeit he may not have studied logic; (. . .) The mind of the
Oriental, on the other hand, like his picturesque streets, is emi-
nently wanting in symmetry” [Lord Cromer, 1908, quoted from
Said (1979)]. This fits into the idea of an Eastern holistic (respec-
tively undistinguished, synthetical, and Oriental) self, contrasted
to a Western analytical (respectively independent, rational, and
European) self, which is put forward by Markus and Kitayama:
“[. . . ] a holistic view is in opposition to the Cartesian, dualistic
tradition that characterizesWestern thinking and in which the self
is separated from the object and from the natural world.”
Based on this continuity, the quoted CN studies must be
regarded as part of a postcolonial, orientalist history and their
results cannot be considered as neutral truths, but rather as
perspectives which are deeply rooted in colonial knowledge pro-
duction. These perspectives reinforce Western dominance in a
postcolonial situation andmiss the opportunity to illustrate other
possible views on the world. This is a structure which remains in
force, independently of the individual valuations of this binarity
by the researchers. The bifid order itself and not necessarily the
valuation of one of the two poles are therefore problematized.
Notwithstanding of the contextual setting or “cultural” back-
ground of a neuroscientist, we plead for taking into account the
colonial legacies of these epistemological orderings of the world
and their manifold contemporary repercussions.
CONCLUSION
In this Perspective we analyzed both current poster abstracts from
the 18th Annual Meeting of the OHBM in Beijing and scientific
research published in peer-reviewed journals addressing the neu-
ral foundations of “culturally” shaped ways of treating the self.
Our aim was to disclose their presumed and often unexamined
implications. We elaborated that the comparisons within cultural
neuroscience studies referring to the self are not based on pos-
tulated “naturally given facts,” but result from a (post-)colonial
argumentation pattern. With Balibar (2011) and Taguieff (1991)
we argue that drawn “cultural” comparisons underlie the risk
of reproducing Eurocentric structures of domination, implying
neo-racist, essentialized categories and stereotypes. Functional
neuroimaging techniques thereby offer an easy and tempting
option to translate former “psychological” findings on “cul-
tural differences,” as based on the findings in the review by
Markus and Kitayama, onto a “biological” level. The danger of
a Looping Effect (Hacking, 1995) becomes evident, since the pro-
duced knowledge, particularly knowledge based on “hard data”
from the neurosciences, has the status of great scientific truth in
society.
Although often advocated in our, in part controversial, poster
discussions at the Annual Meeting, we claim that the obtained
functional MRI data is never neutral (Martínez Mateo et al.,
2013). Both at the level of hypotheses generation and at the level
of data interpretation, all research is influenced by specific socio-
political and historical contexts. In this respect we argue that all
quoted CN studies referring to the self are rooted in a specific
context which defines the relevant research questions and top-
ics and the way of interpretation. This context is traversed by
social circumstances, political interests, and imbalances of power
(Martínez Mateo et al., 2012).
Another critique of ours relates to the fact that scientific
discourses always run the risk of self-referential biasing, which
is especially fostered by the fact that almost all CN research
ideas are based on one single influential review on cross-
cultural psychological findings (Markus and Kitayama, 1991).
This self-referentiality of CN studies generates and, at the
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same time, confirms scientific facts making it difficult to question
the underlying premises.
In sum, during our poster discussions at the Annual
Meeting of the OHBM it became evident that this debate
is overdue to entry the neuroscience community. We believe
that critical analyses regarding (i) the way research ques-
tions are formed, as well as, (ii) how research findings
are projected back into society, are as yet neglected
necessities.
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